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Abstract
As machine learning systems become more pow-
erful they also become increasingly unpredictable
and opaque. Yet, finding human-understandable
explanations of how they work is essential for
their safe deployment. This technical report illus-
trates a methodology for investigating the causal
mechanisms that drive the behaviour of artificial
agents. Six use cases are covered, each addressing
a typical question an analyst might ask about an
agent. In particular, we show that each question
cannot be addressed by pure observation alone,
but instead requires conducting experiments with
systematically chosen manipulations so as to gen-
erate the correct causal evidence.
Keywords: Agent analysis, black-box analysis,
causal reasoning, AI safety.
1. Introduction
Unlike systems specifically engineered for solving a
narrowly-scoped task, machine learning systems such as
deep reinforcement learning agents are notoriously opaque.
Even though the architecture, algorithms, and training data
are known to the designers, the complex interplay between
these components gives rise to a black-box behavior that
is generally intractable to predict. This problem wors-
ens as the field makes progress and AI agents become
more powerful and general. As illustrated by learning-to-
learn approaches, learning systems can use their experience
to induce algorithms that shape their entire information-
processing pipeline, from perception to memorization to
action (Wang et al., 2016; Andrychowicz et al., 2016).
Such poorly-understood systems do not come with the nec-
essary safety guarantees for deployment. From a safety
perspective, it is therefore paramount to develop black-box
methodologies (e.g. suitable for any agent architecture) that
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allow for investigating and uncovering the causal mecha-
nisms that underlie an agent’s behavior. Such methodologies
would enable analysts to explain, predict, and preempt fail-
ure modes (Russell et al., 2015; Amodei et al., 2016; Leike
et al., 2017).
This technical report outlines a methodology for investi-
gating agent behavior from a mechanistic point of view.
Mechanistic explanations deliver a deeper understanding of
agency because they describe the cause-effect relationships
that govern behavior—they explain why an agent does what
it does. Specifically, agent behavior ought to be studied
using the tools of causal analysis (Spirtes et al., 2000; Pearl,
2009; Dawid, 2015). In the methodology outlined here, ana-
lysts conduct experiments in order to confirm the existence
of hypothesized behavioral structures of AI systems. In
particular, the methodology encourages proposing simple
causal explanations that refer to high-level concepts (“the
agent prefers green over red apples”) that abstract away the
low-level (neural) inner workings of an agent.
Using a simulator, analysts can place pre-trained agents into
test environments, recording their reactions to various inputs
and interventions under controlled experimental conditions.
The simulator provides additional flexibility in that it can,
among other things, reset the initial state, run a sequence
of interactions forward and backward in time, change the
seed of the pseudo-random number generator, or spawn a
new branch of interactions. The collected data from the sim-
ulator can then be analyzed using a causal reasoning engine
where researchers can formally express their assumptions
by encoding them as causal probabilistic models and then
validate their hypotheses. Although labor-intensive, this
human-in-the-loop approach to agent analysis has the ad-
vantage of producing human-understandable explanations
that are mechanistic in nature.
2. Methodology
We illustrate this methodology through six use cases, se-
lected so as to cover a spectrum of prototypical questions
an agent analyst might ask about the mechanistic drivers
of behavior. For each use case, we present a minimalis-
tic grid-world example and describe how we performed
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behavioral manipulations, but direct interventions on the
internal state of agents are also possible. The simplicity in
our examples is for the sake of clarity only; conceptually,
all solution methods carry over to more complex scenarios
under appropriate experimental controls.
Our approach uses several components: an agent and an
environment, a simulator of interaction trajectories, and a
causal reasoning engine. These are described in turn.
2.1. Agents and environments
For simplicity, we consider stateful agents and environments
that exchange interaction symbols (i.e. actions and obser-
vations) drawn from finite sets in chronological order at
discrete time steps t = 1, 2, 3, . . . Typically, the agent is a
system that was pre-trained using reinforcement learning
and the environment is a partially-observable Markov de-
cision process, such as in Figure 1a. Let mt, wt (agent’s
memory state, world state) and at, ot (action, observation)
denote the internal states and interaction symbols at time t
of the agent and the environment respectively. These inter-
actions influence the stochastic evolution of their internal
states according to the following (causal) conditional proba-
bilities:
wt ∼ P (wt | wt−1, at−1) ot ∼ P (ot | wt) (1)
mt ∼ P (mt | mt−1, ot) at ∼ P (at | mt). (2)
These dependencies are illustrated in the causal Bayesian
network of Figure 1b describing the perception-action loop
(Tishby & Polani, 2011).
Since we wish to have complete control over the stochastic
components of the interaction process (by controlling its
random elements), we turn the above into a deterministic
system through a re-parameterization1. Namely, we repre-
sent the above distributions using functions W,M,O,A as
follows:
wt =W (wt−1, at−1, ω) ot = O(wt, ω) (3)
mt =M(mt−1, ot, ω) at = A(mt, ω) (4)
where ω ∼ P (ω) is the random seed. This re-
parameterization is natural in the case of agents and en-
vironments implemented as programs.
2.2. Simulator
The purpose of the simulator is to provide platform for exper-
imentation. Its primary function is to generate traces (roll-
outs) of agent-environment interactions (Figure 2). Given a
1That is, we describe the system as a structural causal model
as described in Pearl (2009, chapter 7). Although this parame-















Figure 1. Agents and environments. a) The goal of the agent is to
pick up a reward pill without stepping into a lava tile. b) Causal
Bayesian network describing the generative process of agent-
environment interactions. The environmental state Wt and the
agent’s memory state Mt evolve through the exchange of action
and observation symbols At and Ot respectively.
system made from coupling an agent and an environment, a
random seed ω ∼ P (ω), and a desired length T , it generates
a trace
τ = (ω, s1, x1), (ω, s2, x2), (ω, s3, x3), . . . , (ω, sT , xT )
of a desired length T , where the st := (ωt,mt) and
xt := (ot, at) are the combined state and interaction sym-
bols respectively, and where ω is the random element which
has been made explicit. The simulator can also contract
(rewind) or expand the trace to an arbitrary time point
T ′ ≥ 1. Note that this works seamlessly as the genera-
tive process of the trace is deterministic.
In addition, the simulator allows for manipulations of the
trace. Such an intervention at time t can alter any of the
three components of the triple (ω, st, xt). For instance,
changing the random seed in the first time step corresponds
to sampling a new trajectory:
τ = (ω, s1, x1), (ω, s2, x2), . . . , (ω, sT , xT )
↓
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whereas changing the state at time step t = 2 produces a
new branch of the process sharing the same root:
τ = (ω, s1, x1), (ω, s2, x2), . . . , (ω, sT , xT )
↓

















Figure 2. Simulating a trace (rollout) and performing interventions, creating new branches.
Using these primitives one can generate a wealth of data
about the behavior of the system. This is illustrated in
Figure 2.
2.3. Causal reasoning engine
Finally, in order to gain a mechanistic understanding of the
agent’s behavior from the data generated by the simulator,
it is necessary to use a formal system for reasoning about
statistical causality. The purpose of the causal reasoning
engine is to allow analysts to precisely state and validate
their causal hypotheses using fully automated deductive
reasoning algorithms.
As an illustration of the modeling process, consider an an-
alyst wanting to understand whether an agent avoids lava
when trying to reach a goal state. First, the analyst selects
the set of random variables X they want to use to model the
situation2. The variables could consist of (abstract) features
computed from the trajectories (e.g. “agent takes left path”)
and hypothesis variables (e.g. “the agent avoids lava tiles”).
The objective is to obtain a simplified model that abstracts
away all but the relevant features of the original interaction
system.
Next, the analyst specifies a structural causal model (Pearl,
2009, Chapter 7) to describe the causal generative process
over the chosen random variables. To illustrate, consider an
experiment that can be described using three random vari-
ables, X = {X,Y, Z}. Assume that X precedes Y , and Y
in turn precedes Z, as shown in Figure 3. A structural causal
2There are some subtleties involved in the selection of random
variables. For example, if you want to be able to make arbitrary in-
terventions, the variables should be logically independent. Halpern
& Hitchcock (2011) provide a discussion.
model for this situation would be the system of equations
X = fX(UX) UX ∼ P (UX)
Y = fY (X,UY ) UY ∼ P (UY )
Z = fZ(X,Y, UZ) UZ ∼ P (UZ)
(7)
where fX , fY , and fZ are (deterministic) functions and
where the (exogenous) variables UX , UY , UZ encapsulate
the stochastic components of the model. Together, they
induce the conditional probabilities
P (X), P (Y | X), and P (Z | X,Y ). (8)
These probabilities can be directly supplied by the analyst
(e.g. if they denote prior probabilities over hypotheses) or
estimated from Monte-Carlo samples obtained from the






Figure 3. A graphical model representing the structural causal
model in (7).
Once built, the causal model can be consulted to answer
probabilistic queries using the causal reasoning engine.
Broadly, the queries come in three types:
Page 3
Causal Analysis of Agent Behavior for AI Safety
• Association: Here the analyst asks about a conditional
probability, such as P (X = x | Y = y).
• Intervention: If instead the analyst controls Y directly,
for instance by setting it to the value Y = y, then the
probability of X = x is given by
P (X = x | do(Y = y)).
Here, “do” denotes the do-operator, which substitutes
the equation for Y in the structural model in (7) with
the constant equation Y = y. Hence, the new system
is
X = fX(UX) UX ∼ P (UX)
Y = y UY ∼ P (UY )
Z = fZ(X,Y, UZ) UZ ∼ P (UZ),
(9)
which in this case removes the dependency of Y on X
(and the exogenous variable UY ).
• Counterfactuals: The analyst can also ask counterfac-
tual questions, i.e. the probability of X = x given
the event Y = y had Y = y′ been the case instead.
Formally, this corresponds to
P (Xy = x | Y = y′),
where Xy is the potential response of X when Y = y
is enforced.
These correspond to the three levels of the causal hierarchy
(Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018). We refer the reader to Pearl
et al. (2016) for an introduction to causality and Pearl (2009)
for a comprehensive treatment.
2.4. Analysis workflow
A typical analysis proceeds as follows.
Exploratory investigation. The analyst starts by placing
a trained agent (provided by an agent trainer) into one or
more test environments, and then probing the agent’s be-
havior through interventions using the simulator. This will
inform the analyst about the questions to ask and the vari-
ables needed to answer them.
Formulating the causal model. Next, the analyst for-
mulates a causal model encapsulating all the hypotheses
they want to test. If some probabilities in the model are
not known, the analyst can estimate them empirically us-
ing Monte-Carlo rollouts sampled from the simulator (Fig-
ure 4a). This could require the use of multiple (stock) agents
and environments, especially when the causal hypotheses
contrast multiple types of behavior.
In our examples we used discrete random variables. When




Figure 4. Building a causal model from Monte-Carlo rollouts with
interventions. a) A tree generated from Monte-Carlo rollouts from
an initial state. This tree contains interaction trajectories that the
system can generate by itself. b) When performing experiments,
the analyst could enforce transitions (dotted red lines) that the
system would never take by itself, such as e.g. “make a lava tile
appear next to the agent”. The associated subtrees (red) need to
be built from Monte-Carlo rollouts rooted at the states generated
through the interventions. c) Finally, the rollout trees can be used
to estimate the probabilities of a causal model.
causal model following a Bayesian approach. More pre-
cisely, for each conditional probability table that had to be
estimated, we placed a flat Dirichlet prior over each out-
come, and then computed the posterior probabilities using
the Monte-Carlo counts generated by the simulator. The ac-
curacy of the estimate can be controlled through the number
of samples generated.
Interventions require special treatment (Figure 4b). When-
ever the analyst performs an intervention that creates a new
branch (for instance, because the intervention forces the
system to take a transition which has probability zero), the
transition probabilities of the subtree must be estimated sep-
arately. The transition taken by the intervention itself has
zero counts, but it has positive probability mass assigned
by the Dirichlet prior. Interventions that do not generate
new branches do not require any special treatment as they
already have Monte-Carlo samples.
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Queries. Once built (Figure 4c), the analyst can query
the causal model to answer questions of interest. These
can/should then also be verified empirically using the simu-
lator.
3. Experiments
In the following, we present six use cases illustrating typical
mechanistic investigations an analyst can carry out:
• estimating causal effects under confounding;
• testing for the use of internal memory;
• measuring robust generalization of behavior;
• imagining counterfactual behavior;
• discovering causal mechanisms;
• and studying the causal pathways in decisions.
In each case we assume the agent trainer and the analyst do
not share information, i.e. we assume the analyst operates
under black box conditions. However, the analyst has access
to a collection of pre-trained stock agents, which they can
consult/use for formulating their hypotheses.
The environments we use were created using the Pycolab
game engine (Stepleton, 2017). They are 2D gridworlds
where the agent can move in the four cardinal directions
and interact with objects through pushing or walking over
them. Some of the objects are rewards, doors, keys, floors of
different types, etc. The agent’s goal is to maximize the sum
of discounted cumulative rewards (Puterman, 2014; Sutton
& Barto, 2018). The environments use a random seed for
their initialization (e.g. for object positions).
In theory, the agents can be arbitrary programs that produce
an action given an observation and an internal memory
state; but here we used standard deep reinforcement learning
agents with a recurrent architecture (see Appendix).
3.1. Causal effects under confounding
Problem. Do rewards guide the agent, or do other fac-
tors control its behavior? Estimating causal effects is the
quintessential problem of causal inference. The issue is that
simply observing how the presumed independent and de-
pendent variables co-vary does not suffice, as there could be
a third confounding variable creating a spurious association.
For instance, sometimes an agent solves a task (e.g. picking
up a reward pill), but it does so by relying on an accidentally
correlated feature (e.g. the color of the floor) rather than the
intended one (e.g. location of the pill). Such policies do not
generalize (Arjovsky et al., 2019).
Figure 5. The grass-sand environment. The goal of the agent is
to pick up a reward pill, located in one of the ends of a T-maze.
Reaching either end of the maze terminates the episode. The
problem is that the floor type (i.e. either grass or sand) is correlated
with the location of the reward.
To find out whether the agent has learned the desired causal
dependency, one can directly manipulate the independent
variable and observe the effect. This manipulation decouples
the independent variable from a possible confounder (Pearl,
2009, Chapter 3). Randomized controlled trials are the
classical example of this approach (Fisher, 1936).
Setup. We illustrate the problem of estimating causal ef-
fects using the grass-sand environment depicted in Figure 5.
The agent needs to navigate a T-maze in order to collect a
pill (which provides a reward) at the end of one of the two
corridors (Olton, 1979). The problem is that the location of
the pill (left or right) and the type of the floor (grass or sand)
are perfectly correlated. Given an agent that successfully
collects the pills, the goal of the analyst is to determine
whether it did so because it intended to collect the pills, or
whether it is basing its decision on the type of the floor.
Our experimental subjects are two agents, named A and B.
Agent A was trained to solve T-mazes with either the (sand,
left) or (grass, right) configuration; whereas agent B was
trained to solve any of the four combinations of the floor
type and reward pill location.
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Figure 6. Causal model for the grass-sand environment. R is the
location of the reward pill; T is the terminal state chosen by the
agent; F is the type of the floor; and C is a confounder that
correlates R and F . Note that C is unobserved.
Experiment. The experiment proceeds as follows. First,
we randomly choose between the (sand, left) and (grass,
right) T-mazes and place the agent in the starting position.
Then we randomly decide whether to switch the pill location.
After this intervention, we let the agent navigate until it
finishes the episode, recording whether it took the right or
left terminal state.
We also considered the following hypothesis: namely, that
the agent’s behavior depends on the type of the floor. To
measure the causal effect, we randomly intervened this fea-
ture, recording the agent’s subsequent choice of the terminal
state. The causal model(s) are depicted in Figure 6.
Results. Table 1 shows the results of the interventions.
Here, the random variables T ∈ {l, r}, R ∈ {l, r}, and
F ∈ {g, s} correspond to the agent’s choice of the terminal
state, the location of the reward pill, and the type of the
floor, respectively. The reported values are the posterior
probabilities (conditioned on 1000 rollouts) of choosing
the left/right terminal for the observational setting (i.e. by
just observing the behavior of the agent) and for the two
interventional regimes.
The probability of taking the left terminal conditioned on the
left placement of the reward was obtained through standard
conditioning:
P (T = l | R = l) =∑
f
P (T = l | F = f,R = l)P (F = f | R = l). (10)
In contrast, intervening on the reward location required the
use of the adjustment formula as follows (Pearl, 2009)
P (T = l | do(R = l)) =∑
f
P (T = l | F = f,R = l)P (F = f). (11)
Other quantities were obtained analogously.
We found that the two agents differ significantly. In the
observational regime, both agents successfully solve the
task, picking up the reward pill. However, manipulating the
environmental factors reveals a difference in their behavioral
drivers. Agent A’s choice is strongly correlated with the type
of floor, but is relatively insensitive to the position of the
pill. In contrast, agent B picks the terminal state with the
reward pill, regardless of the floor type.
Table 1. Grass-sand queries
QUERIES A B
P (T = l | R = l) 0.996 0.996
P (T = r | R = r) 0.987 0.996
P (T = l | do(R = l)) 0.536 0.996
P (T = r | do(R = r)) 0.473 0.996
P (T = l | do(F = g)) 0.996 0.515
P (T = r | do(F = s)) 0.987 0.497
Discussion. This use case illustrates a major challenge
in agent training and analysis: to ensure the agent uses
the intended criteria for its decisions. Because it was
trained on a collection of environments with a built-in bias,
agent A learned to rely on an undesired, but more salient
feature. This is a very common phenomenon. Resolving
the use of spurious correlations in learned policies is on-
going research—see for instance (Bareinboim et al., 2015;
Arjovsky et al., 2019; Volodin et al., 2020).
Our experiment shows that inspecting the agent’s behavior
does not suffice for diagnosing the problem, but indepen-
dently manipulating the intended decision criterion (i.e. the
reward location) does. Once the problem is discovered, iden-
tifying the confounding factors (e.g. the floor type) can be a
much harder task for the analyst.
3.2. Memory
Problem. Does the agent use its internal memory for re-
membering useful information, or does it off-load the mem-
ory onto the environment? Memorization is a necessary skill
for solving complex tasks. It can take place in the agent’s
internal memory; however, often it is easier for an agent
to off-load task-relevant information onto its environment
(e.g. through position-encoding), effectively using it as an
external memory. This difference in strategy is subtle and
in fact undetectable without intervening.
To find out whether the agent is actually using its inter-
nal memory, we can make mid-trajectory interventions on
the environment state variables suspected of encoding task-
relevant information. If the agent is using external memory,
this will corrupt the agent’s decision variables, leading to a
faulty behavior.
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a)
b)
Figure 7. The floor-memory environment. a) The goal of the agent
with limited vision (see black square) is to collect the reward at
one of the ends of the T-maze. A cue informs the agent about the
location of the reward. The cue, that can be sand or grass, denotes
if the reward is on the right or left, respectively. b) After three
steps, we intervene by pushing the agent toward the opposite wall
(red arrow), and let it continue thereafter, possibly taking one of
the two dashed paths.
Setup. We test the agent’s memory using the floor-
memory environment depicted in Figure 7. In this T-maze
environment, the agent must remember a cue placed at the
beginning of a corridor in order to know which direction to
go at the end of it (Olton, 1979; Bakker, 2001). This cue can
either be a grass tile or a sand tile, and determines whether
the reward is on the right or the left end, respectively. Both
cue types and reward locations appear with equal probabili-
ties and are perfectly correlated. The agent can only see one
tile around its body.
We consider two subjects. Agent a is equipped with an
internal memory layer (i.e. LSTM cells). In contrast, agent b
is implemented as a convolutional neural network without
a memory layer; it is therefore unable to memorize any
information internally.
Experiment. Gathering rollout data from the test distri-
bution provides no information on whether the agent uses
its internal memory or not. An analyst might prematurely
P T
F
Figure 8. Causal model for the floor-memory environment. F is
the initial cue (floor type); P is the position of the agent mid-way
through the episode; T is the terminal state chosen by the agent.
If the agent off-loads the memory about the initial cue onto the
position, then the link F → T would be missing.
conclude that the agent uses internal memory based on ob-
serving that the agent consistently solves tasks requiring
memorization. However, without intervening, the analyst
cannot truly rule out the possibility that the agent is off-
loading memory onto the environment.
In this example, we can use the following experimental
procedure. First, we let the agent observe the cue and then
freely execute its policy. When the agent is near the end
of the wide corridor, we intervene by pushing the agent
to the opposite wall (see red arrow in Figure 7). This is
because we suspect that the agent could use the nearest
wall, rather than its internal memory, to guide its navigation.
After the intervention, if the agent returns to the original
wall and collects the reward, it must be because it is using
its internal memory. If on the contrary, the agent does not
return and simply continues its course, we can conclude it
is off-loading memorization onto its environment.
We model the situation using three random variables. The
floor type (grass or sand) is denoted by F ∈ {g, s}. The
variable P ∈ {l, r} denotes the position of the agent (left
or right half-side of the room) at the position when the
analyst could execute an intervention. Finally, T ∈ {l, r}
represents where the agent is (left or right) when the episode
ends. To build the model we randomly decide whether the
analyst is going to intervene or not (i.e. by pushing) with
equal probability. The estimation is performed using 1000
Monte-Carlo rollouts for each case.
Results. Table 2 shows the probabilities obtained by
querying the causal model from Figure 8. The first four
queries correspond to an observational regime. We see that
both agents pick the correct terminal tiles (T = l or T = r)
with probability close to 1 when conditioning on the cue
(F ) and, additionally, do so by choosing the most direct
path (P = l or P = r). However, the results from the
interventional regime in the last two rows show that agent
A = b loses its track when being pushed. This demonstrates
that agent b is using an external memory mechanism that
generalizes poorly. In contrast, agent A = a ends up in the
correct terminal tile even if it is being pushed to the opposite
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wall.
Table 2. Floor-memory queries for agent a (with internal memory)
and b (without internal memory).
QUERIES A = a A = b
P (T = l | F = g) 0.996 0.990
P (T = r | F = s) 0.996 0.977
P (P = l | F = g) 0.984 0.991
P (P = r | F = s) 0.996 0.985
P (T = l | do(P = r), F = g) 0.996 0.107
P (T = r | do(P = l), F = s) 0.996 0.004
Discussion. Agent generalization and performance on par-
tially observable environments depends strongly on the ap-
propriate use of memory. From a safety perspective, flawed
memory mechanisms that off-load memorization can lead to
fragile behavior or even catastrophic failures. Understand-
ing how AI agents store and recall information is critical to
prevent such failures. As shown in the previous experiment,
the analyst can reveal the undesired use of external memory
by appropriately intervening on the environmental factors
that are suspected of being used by the agent to encode
task-relevant information.
3.3. Robust generalization
Problem. Does the agent solve any instance within a tar-
get class of tasks? Although agents trained through deep
reinforcement learning seem to solve surprisingly complex
tasks, they struggle to transfer this knowledge to new envi-
ronments. This weakness is usually hidden by the, unfortu-
nately common, procedure of testing reinforcement learning
agents on the same set of environments used for training.
Importantly, detecting the failure to generalize to a desired
class of environments is key for guaranteeing the robustness
of AI agents.
Two problems arise when assessing the generalization abil-
ity of agents. First, testing the agent on the entire class of
target environments is typically intractable. Second, the an-
alyst might be interested in identifying the instances within
the class of test environments where the agent fails to solve
the task, rather than only measuring the average test perfor-
mance, which could hide the failure modes. This highlights
the need for the analyst to assess generalization through the
careful choice of multiple targeted tests.
Setup. We illustrate how to test for generalization using
the pick-up environment shown in Figure 9. This is a simple
squared room containing a reward which upon collection
terminates the episode. The analyst is interested in finding
out whether the agent generalizes well to all possible reward
locations.
Figure 9. The pick-up environment. The goal of the agent is to
collect the reward independent of their initial position.
We consider the following two agents as subjects. Both
agents were trained on a class of environments where their
initial position and the reward location were chosen ran-
domly. However, agent A’s task distribution picks locations
anywhere within the room, whereas agent B’s training tasks
restricted the location of the reward to the southern quadrant
of the room. Thus only agent A should be general with
respect to the class of environments of interest.
Experiment. Assume the test set is the restricted class
of problem instances where rewards were restricted to the
southern corner. Then, if the analyst were to test A and B,
they could prematurely conclude that both agents general-
ize. However, assessing generalization requires a different
experimental procedure.
The experiment proceeds as follows. We draw an initial state
of the system from the test distribution, and subsequently
intervene by moving the reward to an arbitrary location
within the room. After the intervention, we let the agent
freely execute its policy and we observe if the reward was
collected or not. A collected reward provides evidence that
the agent generalizes under this initial condition.
We built one causal model per agent from 1000 intervened
Monte-Carlo rollouts. The variables are: G ∈ {n, s, e, w},
the quadrant location of the reward (north, south, east, west);
and R ∈ {0, 1}, denoting whether the reward is collected or
not. Figure 10 shows the causal graph for both models.
Results. We performed a number of queries on the causal
models shown in Table 3. Firstly, both agents perform very
well when evaluated on the test distribution over problem
instances, since P (R = 1) ≈ 1 in both cases. However, the
intervened environments tell a different story. As expected,
agent A performs well on all locations of the reward, sug-
gesting that meta-training on the general task distribution
was sufficient for acquiring the reward location invariance.
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R
G
Figure 10. Causal model for the pick-up environment. G is the
location of the reward pill and R is a binary variable indicating a
successful pick-up.
Agent B performs well when the reward is in the southern
quadrant, but under-performs in the rest of the conditions.
Interestingly, the performance decays as the distance from
the southern quadrant increases, suggesting that there was
some degree of topological generalization.
Table 3. Pick-up environment queries for agents A = a and A = b.
QUERIES A = a A = b
P (R = 1) 0.988 0.965
P (R = 1 | do(G = n)) 0.985 0.230
P (R = 1 | do(G = e)) 0.987 0.507
P (R = 1 | do(G = w)) 0.988 0.711
P (R = 1 | do(G = s)) 0.988 0.986
Discussion. In this use-case we outlined a procedure for
assessing the agents’ robust generalization capabilities. Al-
though quantifying generalization in sequential decision-
making problems is still an open problem, we adopted a
pragmatic approach: we say that an agent generalizes ro-
bustly when it successfully completes any task within a
desired class of environments. This requirement is related
to uniform performance and robustness to adversarial at-
tacks. Since testing all instances in the class is unfeasible,
our approximate solution for assessing generalization relies
on subdividing the class and estimating the success probabil-
ities within each subdivision. Even if this approximation is
crude at the beginning of the analysis, it can provide useful
feedback for the analyst. For example, we could further ex-
plore agent B’s generalization by increasing the resolution
of the reward location.
3.4. Counterfactuals
Problem. What would the agent have done had the set-
ting been different? Counterfactual reasoning is a powerful
method assessing an observed course of events. An analyst
can imagine changing one or more observed factors without
changing others, and imagine the outcome that this change
would have led to.
In artificial systems a simulator is often available to the
analyst. Using the simulator, the analyst can directly sim-
ulate counterfactuals by resetting the system to a desired
state, performing the desired change (i.e. intervening), and
running the interactions ensuing thereafter. This approach
yields empirically grounded counterfactuals.
However, simulating counterfactual interactions is not al-
ways possible. This happens whenever:
(a) a realistic simulation for this setting does not exist (e.g.
for an agent acting in the real world);
(b) a simulation exists, but its use is limited (e.g. when
evaluating proprietary technology).
For instance, the analyst might be presented with a single
behavioral trace of an agent that was trained using an un-
known training procedure. Answering counterfactual ques-
tions about this agent requires a behavioral model built from
prior knowledge about a population of similar or related
agents. This is the case which we examine through our
experiment. The downside is that such counterfactuals do
not make empirically verifiable claims (Dawid, 2000).
Setup. We discuss this problem using the gated-room en-
vironment depicted in Figure 11a. The environment consists
of two identical rooms each holding a red and a green re-
ward. Collection of the reward terminates the episode. The
rooms are initially protected by two gates but one of them
randomly opens at the beginning of the episode. We assume
there exist two types of agents, classified as either loving
green or red reward pills.
Experiment. Assume we make a single observation
where an unknown agent picks up a red reward in an en-
vironment where the right gate is open (Figure 11b). We
can now ask: “What would have happened had the left gate
been opened instead?” If we had direct access to the agent’s
and the environment’s internals, we could reset the episode,
change which gate is open, and observe what the agent does
(Figure 11c). But what if this is not possible?
In order to answer this question, we built a behavioral model
using prior knowledge and data. First, we trained two agents
that were rewarded for collecting either a green or red re-
ward respectively. These agents were then used to create
likelihood models for the two hypotheses using Monte-Carlo
sampling. Second, we placed a uniform prior over the two
hypotheses and on the open door, and assumed that neither
variable precedes the other causally. The resulting causal
model, shown in Figure 12, uses three random variables:
A ∈ {gr, re} denotes the agent type (green-loving or red-
loving); D ∈ {l, r} stands for the open door; and finally
R ∈ {gr, re} corresponds to the reward collected by the
agent.
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a) b) c)
Figure 11. The gated-room environments. Panel a: In each instance of the environment, either the left or the right gate will be open
randomly. The goal of the agent is to pick up either a red or green reward, after which the episode terminates. Panels b & c: Counterfactual
estimation. If the right door is open and we observe the agent picking up the red reward (b), then we can predict that the agent would pick
up the red reward had the left door been open (c).
R
A D
Figure 12. Causal model for the gated-room environment. A corre-
sponds to the type of agent (green- or red-pill loving); D indicates
which one of the two doors is open; and R denotes the color of the
pill picked up by the agent.
Results. We performed a number of queries on the model.
The results are shown in Table 4. We first performed three
sanity checks. Before seeing any evidence, we see that the
prior probabilities P (R = gr) and P (R = re) of a random
agent picking either a green or a red reward is 0.5. After
observing the agent picking up a red reward (R = re) when
the left gate is open (D = l), we conclude that it must
be a red-loving agent (A = re) with probability 0.9960.
Note that since the hypothesis about the agent type and the
opened door are independent, this probability is the same if
we remove the door from the condition.
Having seen a trajectory, we can condition our model and
ask the counterfactual question. Formally, this question is
stated as
P (RD=r = re | D = l, R = re),
that is, given that we have observed D = l and R = re,
what is the probability of the potential responseRD=r = re,
that is, R = re had D = r been the case? The result,
0.9920 ≈ 1, tells us that the agent would also have picked
up the red reward had the other door been open, which
is in line with our expectations. Furthermore, due to the
symmetry of the model, we get the same result for the
probability of picking a green reward had the right door
been open for an agent that picks up a green reward when
the left door is open.
Table 4. Gated-room queries
QUERIES PROBABILITY
P (R = re) 0.500
P (A = re | R = re) 0.996
P (A = re | D = l, R = re) 0.996
P (RD=r = re | D = l, R = re) 0.992
P (RD=r = gr | D = l, R = gr) 0.992
Discussion. Following the example above, we can natu-
rally see that we are only able to ask counterfactual ques-
tions about the behavior of a particular agent when we can
rely on prior knowledge about a reference agent population.
For instance, this is the case when the agent under study
was drawn from a distribution of agents for which we have
some previous data or reasonable priors. If we do not have
a suitable reference class, then we cannot hope to make
meaningful counterfactual claims.
3.5. Causal induction
Problem. What is the causal mechanism driving an ob-
served behavior? Discovering the mechanisms which under-
lie an agent’s behavior can be considered the fundamental
problem of agent analysis. All the use cases reviewed so
far depend on the analyst knowing the causal structure gov-
erning the agent’s behavior. However this model is often
not available in a black-box scenario. In this case, the first
task of the analyst is to discover the behavioral mechanisms
through carefully probing the agent with a variety of in-
puts and recording their responses (Griffiths & Tenenbaum,
2005).
Discovering causal structure is an induction problem. This
is unlike a deduction task, where the analyst can derive un-
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Figure 13. The mimic environment. Both agents either step to the
left or the right together. The analyst’s goal is to discover which
one is the lead, and which one is the imitator.
equivocal conclusions from a set of facts. Rather, induction
problems do not have right or wrong answers and require
maintaining multiple plausible explanations (Rathmanner &
Hutter, 2011).
In this use case, we demonstrate how to induce a distribu-
tion over competing causal models for explaining an agent’s
behavior given experimental data. Although temporal order
is often informative about the causal dependencies among
random variables, the careful analyst must consider the pos-
sibility that a cause and its effect might be observed simul-
taneously or in reversed temporal order. Thus, in general,
observing does not suffice: to test a causal dependency the
analyst must manipulate one variable and check whether it
influences another3. This principle is often paraphrased as
“no causes in, no causes out” (Cartwright et al., 1994).
Setup. We exemplify how to induce a causal dependency
using the mimic environment shown in Figure 13. Two
agents, blue and red, are placed in a corridor. Then, both
agents move simultaneously one step in either direction.
One of the two agents is the leader and the other the imi-
tator: the leader chooses its direction randomly, whereas
the imitator attempts to match the leader’s choice in the
same time step, but sampling a random action 10% of the
time. The analyst’s task is to find out which agent is the
leader. Note there is no way to answer this question from
observation alone.
Experiment. We built the causal model as follows. First,
we decided to model this situation using three random vari-
ables: L ∈ {b, r}, corresponding to the hypothesis that
either the blue or red agent is the leader, respectively;
B ∈ {l, r}, denoting the step the blue agent takes; and
similarly R ∈ {l, r} for the red agent. The likelihood mod-
3Although, there are cases where partial structure can be de-





Figure 14. Causal models for the mimic environment. Each model
has the same prior probability is being correct. B and R indicate
the direction in which the blue and the red agents respectively
move.
els were estimated from 1000 Monte-Carlo rollouts, where
each rollout consists of an initial and second time step. With
the constructed dataset we were able to estimate the joint
distribution P (B,R). Since this distribution is purely obser-
vational and thus devoid of causal information, we further
factorized it according to our two causal hypotheses, namely
P (B,R) = P (B)P (R|B) (12)
for the hypothesis that blue is the leader (L = b), and
P (B,R) = P (R)P (B|R) (13)
for the competing hypothesis (L = r). This yields two
causal models. Finally, we placed a uniform prior over the
two causal models L = b and L = a. See Figure 14. Notice
that both causal models are observationally indistinguish-
able.
This symmetry can be broken through intervention. To do
so, we force the red agent into a random direction (say,
left) and record the response of the blue agent (left). The
posterior probabilities over the intervened hypotheses are
then proportional to
P (L = b | do(R = l), B = l) ∝
P (L = b)P (B = l|L = b), and
P (L = r | do(R = l), B = l) ∝
P (L = r)P (B = l|L = r,R = l). (14)
Notice how the intervened factors drop out of the likelihood
term.
Table 5. Mimic queries
QUERIES PROBABILITY
P (L = b) 0.500
P (L = b | R = l, B = l) 0.500
P (L = b | R = l, B = r) 0.500
P (L = b | do(R = l), B = l) 0.361
P (L = b | do(R = l), B = r) 0.823
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Result. We performed the queries shown in Table 5. The
first three queries show that observation does not yield evi-
dence for any of the causal hypotheses:
P (L = b) = P (L = b | R = l, B = l)
= P (L = b | R = l, B = r).
However, pushing the red agent to the left renders the two
hypotheses asymmetrical, as can be seen by
P (L = b) 6= P (L = b | do(R = l), B = l)
6= P (L = b | do(R = l), B = r).
Thus, observing that the blue agent moves to the right after
our intervention allows us to conclude that the blue agent is
likely to be the leader.
Discussion. Our experiment illustrates a Bayesian pro-
cedure for discovering the causal mechanisms in agents.
The main take-away is that inducing causal mechanisms
requires: (a) postulating a collection of causal hypotheses,
each one proposing alternative mechanistic explanations for
the same observed behavior; and (b) carefully selecting and
applying manipulations in order to render the likelihood of
observations unequal.
3.6. Causal pathways
Problem. How do we identify an agent’s decision-making
pathways? In previous examples we have focused on study-
ing how environmental factors influence the agent’s behav-
ior. However, we did not isolate the specific chain of mecha-
nisms that trigger a decision. Understanding these pathways
is crucial for identifying the sources of malfunction. To
estimate the effect of a given pathway, one can chain to-
gether the effects of the individual mechanisms along the
path (Shpitser, 2013; Chiappa, 2019).
Setup. We illustrate the analysis of causal pathways using
the key-door environment shown in Figure 15. The agent
finds itself in a room where there is a key and a door. The
starting position of the agent, the location of the key, and the
state of the door (open/closed) are all randomly initialized.
Behind the door there is a reward which terminates the
episode when picked up.
We consider two agent subjects. Agent A appears to only
pick-up the key if the door is closed and then collects the
reward. This agent acquired this policy by training it on the
entire set of initial configurations (i.e. open/closed doors,
key and agent positions). Agent B always collects the key,
irrespective of the state of the door, before navigating toward
the reward. This behavior was obtained by training the agent
only on the subset of instances where the door was closed.
Nonetheless, both policies generalize. The analyst’s task is
Figure 15. The key-door environment. The goal of the agent is to
collect the reward, which terminates the episode. However, the
reward is behind a door which is sometimes closed. To open it, the





A = a A = b
Figure 16. Causal models for the key-door environment. D in-
dicates whether the door is open; K flags whether the agent
picks up the key; and R denotes whether the agent collects the
reward pill. Here, the second model does not include the pathway
D → K → R; hence, the agent picks up the key irrespective of
the state of the door.
to determine the information pathway used by the agents in
order to solve the task; in particular, whether the agent is
sensitive to whether the door is open or closed.
Experiment. We chose three random variables to model
this situation: D ∈ {o, c}, determining whether the door
is initially open or closed; K ∈ {y, n}, denoting whether
the agent picked up the key; and finally, R ∈ {1, 0}, the
obtained reward. Figure 16 shows the causal models.
Results. We investigate the causal pathways through a
number of queries listed in Table 6. First, we verify that
both agents successfully solve the task, i.e. P (R = 1) ≈ 1.
Now we proceed to test for the causal effect of the initial
state of the door on the reward, via the key collection activity.
In other words, we want to verify whether D → K → R.
This is done in a backwards fashion by chaining the causal
effects along a path.
First, we inspect the link K → R. In the case of agent A,
the reward appears to be independent of whether the key is
collected, since
P (R = 1 | K = y) ≈ P (R = 1 | K = n) ≈ 1.
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Table 6. Key-door queries
QUERIES A = a A = b
P (R = 1) 0.977 0.991
—
P (R = 1 | K = y) 0.974 0.993
P (R = 1 | K = n) 0.989 0.445
P (R = 1 | do(K = y)) 0.979 0.993
P (R = 1 | do(K = n)) 0.497 0.334
—
P (K = y | do(D = c)) 0.998 0.998
P (K = y | do(D = o)) 0.513 0.996
—
P (R = 1 | D = c) 0.960 0.988
P (R = 1 | D = o) 0.995 0.995
f(D = c), SEE (15) 0.978 0.992
P (D = o), SEE (15) 0.744 0.991
However, this is association and not causation. The causal
effect of collecting the key is tested by comparing the inter-
ventions, that is,
P (R = 1 | do(K = y))− P (R = 1 | do(K = n)).
Here it is clearly seen that both agents use this mechanism
for solving the task, since the difference in probabilities is
high. This establishes K → R.
Second, we ask for the causal effect of the initial state of
the door on collecting the key, i.e. D → K. Using the
same rationale as before, this is verified by comparing the
intervened probabilities:
P (K = y | do(D = c))− P (K = y | do(D = o)).
Here we observe a discrepancy: agent A is sensitive toD but
agent B is not. For the latter, we conclude D 6→ K → R.
Finally, we estimate the causal effect the state of the door
has on the reward, along the causal pathways going through
the settings of K. Let us inspect the case D = c. The
conditional probability is
P (R = 1 | D = c) =∑
k∈{y,n}
P (R = 1 | K = k,D = c)P (K = k | D = c),
and we can easily verify that P (R = 1 | D) ≈ P (R = 1),
that is, D and R are independent. But here again, this is
just association. The causal response along the pathways is
given by
f(D = c) :=∑
k∈{y,n}
P (R = 1 | do(K = k))P (K = k | do(D = c)),
(15)
which is known as a nested potential response (Carey et al.,
2020) or a path-specific counterfactual (Chiappa, 2019).
The desired causal effect is then computed as the difference
between closing and opening the door, i.e.
f(D = c)− f(D = o).
This difference amounts to 0.2338 and 0.0014 ≈ 0 for the
agents A and B respectively, implying that A does indeed
use the causal pathway D → K → R but agent B only uses
K → R.
Discussion. Understanding causal pathways is crucial
whenever not only the final decision, but also the specific
causal pathways an agent uses in order to arrive at said deci-
sion matters. This understanding is critical for identifying
the sources of malfunctions and in applications that are sen-
sitive to the employed decision procedure, such as e.g. in
fairness (Chiappa, 2019). In this experiment we have shown
how to compute causal effects along a desired path using
nested potential responses computed from chaining together
causal effects.
4. Discussion and Conclusions
Related work. The analysis of black-box behavior dates
back to the beginnings of electronic circuit theory (Cauer,
1954) and was first formalized in cybernetics (Wiener, 1948;
Ashby, 1961), which stressed the importance of manipula-
tions in order to investigate the mechanisms of cybernetic
systems. However, the formal machinery for reasoning
about causal manipulations and their relation to statistical
evidence is a relatively recent development (Spirtes et al.,
2000; Pearl, 2009; Dawid, 2015).
A recent line of research related to ours that explicitly uses
causal tools for analyzing agent behavior is Everitt et al.
(2019) and Carey et al. (2020). These studies use causal
incentive diagrams to reason about the causal pathways
of decisions in the service of maximizing utility functions.
Other recent approaches for analyzing AI systems have
mostly focused on white-box approaches for improving
understanding (see for instance Mott et al., 2019; Verma
et al., 2018; Montavon et al., 2018; Puiutta & Veith, 2020)
and developing safety guarantees (Uesato et al., 2018). A
notable exception is the work by Rabinowitz et al. (2018), in
which a model is trained in order to predict agent behavior
from observation in a black-box setting.
Scope. In this report we have focused on the black-box
study of agents interacting with (artificial) environments,
but the methodology works in a variety of other settings:
passive agents like sequence predictors, systems with inter-
active user interfaces such as language models and speech
synthesizers, and multi-agent systems. For example, con-
sider GPT-3 (Brown et al., 2020), a natural language model
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with text-based input-output. This system can be seen as a
perception-action system, for which our methodology ap-
plies. A bigger challenge when dealing with models systems
might be to come up with the right hypotheses, problem ab-
stractions, and interventions.
Features and limitations. The main challenge in the prac-
tice of the proposed methodology is to come up with the
right hypotheses and experiments. This task requires in-
genuity and can be very labor-intensive (Section 2.4). For
instance, while in the grass-sand environment it was easy
to visually spot the confounding variable (Section 3.1), we
cannot expect this to be a viable approach in general. Or,
as we have seen in the problem of causal induction (Sec-
tion 3.5), it is non-trivial to propose a model having a causal
ordering of the variables that differs from the sequence in
which they appear in a sampled trajectory. Given the inher-
ent complexity of reasoning about causal dependencies and
the state of the art in machine learning, it is unclear how to
scale this process through e.g. automation.
On the plus side, the methodology naturally leads to human-
explainable theories of agent behavior, as it is human ana-
lysts who propose and validate them. As illustrated in our
examples, the explanations do not make reference to the
true underlying mechanisms of agents (e.g. the individual
neuronal activations), but instead rely on simplified con-
cepts (i.e. the model variables) that abstract away from the
implementation details. See also Rabinowitz et al. (2018)
for a discussion. The human analyst may also choose an
appropriate level of detail of an explanation, for instance
proposing general models for describing the overall behav-
ior of an agent and several more detailed models to cover
the behavior in specific cases.
We have not addressed the problem of quantifying the un-
certainty in our models. When estimating the conditional
probabilities of the causal models from a limited amount
of Monte-Carlo samples, there exists the possibility that
these deviate significantly from the true probabilities. In
some cases, this could lead to the underestimation of the
probability of failure modes. To quantify the reliability of
estimates, one should supplement them with confidence in-
tervals, ideally in a manner to aid the assessment of risk
factors. In this work we have simply reported the number of
samples used for estimation. Developing a more systematic
approach is left for future work.
Conclusions and outlook. This technical report lays out
a methodology for the systematic analysis of agent behavior.
This was motivated by experience: previously, we have all
too often fallen into the pitfalls of misinterpreting agent
behavior due to the lack of a rigorous method in our ap-
proach. Just as we expect new medical treatments to have
undergone a rigorous causal study, so too do we want AI
systems to have been subjected to similarly stringent tests.
We have shown in six simple situations how an analyst can
propose and validate theories about agent behaviour through
a systematic process of explicitly formulating causal hy-
potheses, conducting experiments with carefully chosen
manipulations, and confirming the predictions made by the
resulting causal models. Crucially, we stress that this mech-
anistic knowledge could only be obtained via directly inter-
acting with the system through interventions. In addition,
we greatly benefited from the aid of an automated causal
reasoning engine, as interpreting causal evidence turns out
to be a remarkably difficult task. We believe this is the way
forward for analyzing and establishing safety guarantees as
AI agents become more complex and powerful.
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A. Architecture and training details
In our experiments we use agents with the following archi-
tecture: 3 convolutional layers with 128 channels (for each
tile type) each and 3× 3 kernels; a dense linear layer with
128 units; a single LSTM layer with 128 units (Hochreiter
& Schmidhuber, 1997); a dense linear layer with 128 units;
and a softmax activation layer for producing stochastic ac-
tions. To train them, we used the Impala policy gradient
algorithm (Espeholt et al., 2018). The gradients of the recur-
rent network were computed with backpropagation through
time (Robinson & Fallside, 1987; Werbos, 1988), and we
used Adam for optimization (Kingma & Ba, 2014). During
training, we randomized the environment and agent seed,
forcing the agent to interact with different settings and pos-
sibly meta-learn a general policy.
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